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Abstract—In this study, we investigate the limits of the current
state of the art AI system for detecting buffer overflows and com-
pare it with current static analysis tools. To do so, we developed a
code generator, s-bAbI, capable of producing an arbitrarily large
number of code samples of controlled complexity. We found that
the static analysis engines we examined have good precision, but
poor recall on this dataset, except for a sound static analyzer that
has good precision and recall. We found that the state of the art
AI system, a memory network modeled after Choi et al. [1], can
achieve similar performance to the static analysis engines, but
requires an exhaustive amount of training data in order to do
so. Our work points towards future approaches that may solve
these problems; namely, using representations of code that can
capture appropriate scope information and using deep learning
methods that are able to perform arithmetic operations.
Index Terms—deep learning, static analysis, memory networks,
question-answering
I. INTRODUCTION
Predicting security defects in source code is of significant
national security interest. It is ideal to detect security defects
during development, before the code is ever run to expose
those defects. The current best methods to find security defects
before running code are static analysis tools, a variety of which
exist and model software in different ways that are all useful
for different kinds of flaws. Developers of static analyzers
carefully equip them with rules about program behavior, which
are used to reason about the safety of the program if it were
to run.
However, static analyzers are known to be insufficient at
finding flaws. The Juliet Test Suite [2]–[4] is a collection of
synthetic code containing intentional security defects across
hundreds of vulnerabilities in the Common Weakness Enumer-
ation standard, labeled at the line-of-code level. Even state-of-
the art static analyzers perform poorly at finding the defects in
Juliet, issuing too many false positives and also too many false
negatives [5]–[8]. Finding an automated method that detects
security defects in Juliet, with acceptably low false-positive
and false-negative counts, is an open problem [4].
Artificial intelligence (AI) as a broad field, and machine
learning as a tool for AI, have both seen great advances
over the last decade. An attractive property of many data-
driven AI systems that ingest large amounts of data and learn
an accurate model of the underlying distribution is that the
features that are most important to describe the model do not
Funding blinded for review.
need to be explicitly extracted. These systems often discover
“hidden” features that a human hand-crafting a model might
never think to include. For recent problems where features
are hard to describe but data is abundant, deep learning has
proven to be an especially useful technique, both for extracting
relevant features and for creating predictive models that use
them. For example, deep learning methods are used in the state
of the art solutions for image recognition, surpassing human
performance [9]; current question answering systems are able
to rival human performance for a subset of tasks focusing
on answering realistic reading comprehension questions [10],
[11]; and a language modeling technique that represents words
from natural-language corpora in two different languages, gen-
erating similar representations for words with similar semantic
content, leads to improved machine translation [12].
To benchmark the advances of AI, it has been useful to
generate datasets that challenge the current state of the art.
The bAbI dataset [13] is a set of simple English-language sto-
ries and accompanying reading comprehension questions and
correct answers. It establishes a target for question-answering
AI systems, such that any such system must be able to
achieve high performance on the bAbI dataset to be considered
successful. This challenge successfully improved the state of
question-answering AI, prompting the development of better
machine learning models that achieved greater performance on
the bAbI dataset, see [14] for a comprehensive list.
This environment naturally leads to investigating whether
data-driven techniques can succeed in modeling existing
source code datasets. Some work has already been done in
AI on code [15], mostly on problems about modeling gaps in
the code from surrounding context; for example, the model
of code2vec [16] is able to suggest the name of a method by
reading the code in the method body. However, there is little
work done yet in using AI to model security defects. The most
significant barrier to this work is the lack of large enough
quantities of data with accurately labeled security defects on
which to train machine learning models. For example, the
Juliet test suite is not ideal for training such models, even
though it has labeled defects, because it has too few examples
and is too complex.
Choi et al [1] are to our knowledge the first to propose a
data-driven model to find security defects in code at the line-
of-code level. They follow an approach similar to bAbI [13]
and show that a deep learning model can in principle be used
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to model buffer overflows. They construct a synthetic code
dataset with labeled safe and unsafe buffer writes, which we
call CJOC-bAbI, and training and testing on this codebase.
However, their dataset does not contain real code–it is not
syntactically valid C, and does not compile. Moreover, none
of the functions in their dataset have any non-trivial control
flow–there are no conditionals or loops, which would always
be found in code developed for real applications. Although
their work is a significant first step in demonstrating the utility
of deep learning for code modeling, these weaknesses leave
important questions unanswered.
To more thoroughly test the utility of AI for code un-
derstanding, a better dataset is needed, that can demonstrate
whether a machine learning system can accurately model non-
trivial control flow. If this dataset is free of other numerous
sources of complexity usually found in source code, then
researchers will be able to cleanly focus on developing models
that are able to capture the relevant details of control flow.
The contributions of this work are as follows:
• We produce a code dataset that we call s-bAbI, containing
syntactically-valid C programs with non-trivial control
flow, and safe and unsafe buffer writes labeled at the line-
of-code level. Although this code is simple as compared
to real-world code, static analyzers do not perform as well
as expected.
• We demonstrate the limits of the work by Choi et al. [1],
showing that their deep learning model needs too much
training data to be reasonably used to model security
defects, and that their approach necessarily overfits to
synthetic datasets, not easily generalizing to real code.
• We point towards future approaches that may solve these
problems; namely, using representations of code that can
capture appropriate scope information and using deep
learning methods that are able to perform arithmetic
operations.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
An example file from our dataset (77056b8250.c) with
non-trivial control flow is shown in Figure 1.
It is fairly easy to tell that the buffer write at line 22 is
unsafe. Doing so requires resolving the value of the index
variable entity_9 and the length of the array entity_7,
and observing that the index is greater than the length of the
array. No knowledge of the control flow structure of the code
granted by the if statement and the while loop is necessary
to decide that this buffer write is unsafe. The existing CJOC-
bAbI dataset frames all of its buffer overflow examples in
a setting not much more complicated than this example,
only requiring variable lookup and a single comparison. We
would expect that any reasonable AI system should be able to
recognize that this line is unsafe.
It is more challenging to tell that the buffer write at line 20
is unsafe. To see this, first we note that entity_3 can take
any integer value on line 9. This means that the condition in
the if statement on line 11 is sometimes true and sometimes
false. Whenever it is false, the else branch executes, setting
Fig. 1. A sample function from our generated dataset.
entity_3 to 69. Since entity_4 is originally 42 (from
line 10), which is less than 69, the while loop on line 15
executes, setting the value of entity_4 to 69. But the length
of the array entity_8 is 11 (from line 5), so the index is
greater than the length of the array at the buffer write on
line 20, and this access is unsafe. We would expect that an
AI system would have more trouble with the harder task of
deciding that this line is unsafe.
To our knowledge, ours is the first paper showing that a
deep learning model has the ability to predict security defects,
at the line-of-code level, in synthetic code with control flow
elements like conditionals and loops.
III. APPROACH
We develop a synthetic code generator that addresses
shortcomings in both the CJOC-bAbI dataset and the Juliet
Test Suite that prevent these datasets from being useful for
developing a data-driven approach to security defect detection.
The CJOC-bAbI dataset is not made of syntactically valid
C code, and none of the examples contain code with any
non-trivial control flow elements like conditionals, loops, or
variables with unknown values, so a data-driven technique
trained and tested on this dataset provides a weak argument
that a similar method will work on real code. On the other
hand, the Juliet Test Suite dataset is far too small and too
complex for current data-driven methods to learn to predict the
labeled security defects. Our dataset presents a compromise,
as it is complex enough to contain non-trivial control flow
elements, but simple and large enough to successfully train
data-driven approaches. In this section, we describe details of
our dataset, give an overview of the static analyzers we test
on this dataset, and describe the deep learning architecture we
compare against these static analyzers by training and testing
on this dataset.
A. s-bAbI: AI tasks for source code
We propose a synthetic C source code dataset generator,
which we call s-bAbI. The purpose of this generator is to
provide the simplest possible source code, labeled at the
line-of-code level with safe and unsafe buffer writes, that
contains control flow structures found in real-world code.
The motivation is analogous to that of the original English-
language bAbI dataset, but adapted to the purpose of code
understanding, namely, that any automated system that claims
to be able to detect buffer overflows at the line-of-code level
should achieve high predictive performance on this dataset.
1) Code: Each file in the s-bAbI dataset is syntactically-
correct C source code, consisting of a single void main()
function. This is an improvement over the dataset developed
by Choi et al [1], which contains syntactically-invalid “C-like”
code examples.
Every s-bAbI code example has at least one of the following
three elements that are found in any non-trivial real-world
code:
• Conditional statements (if/else).
• Loops (for and while).
• Variables with unknown values (set from rand()).
We acknowledge that these are not the only constructions
that are found in non-trivial real-world code, e.g. function
calls would be the next reasonable step to add complexity.
However, even these three elements add enough complexity
to identify weaknesses of both existing static analyzers and
the deep learning model proposed by Choi et al. [1], meeting
the purpose of this dataset.
Every line of an s-bAbI instance that does not modify
control flow contains exactly one of the following:
• Integer variable declaration
• Integer variable set to an integer literal
• Integer variable set to the result of rand()
• Integer variable increment via ++
• Character array declaration with integer literal length
• Character array set at integer variable index (buffer write)
Each buffer write is either safe or unsafe, meaning that the
character array is written to at a value less-than-or-equal-to its
length, or greater than its length, respectively.
2) Labels: The motivation behind our labeling scheme is
that it is ideal for tools to be able to identify all potentially
unsafe lines in a function, not only those which can provably
be reached, so that the developer can be alerted of all bugs
simultaneously.
The generator that produces the s-bAbI dataset produces
exactly one label per line, from the following six labels:
• BUFWRITE_COND_SAFE
• BUFWRITE_COND_UNSAFE
• BUFWRITE_TAUT_SAFE
• BUFWRITE_TAUT_UNSAFE
• BODY
• OTHER
The conditional labels BUFWRITE_COND_SAFE,
BUFWRITE_COND_UNSAFE refer to lines that contain
exactly one buffer write, which is provably either safe or
unsafe (buffer overflow), respectively, such that reasoning
about the control flow is required to prove whether the write
is safe or unsafe. We refer to this kind of vulnerability
as “conditional” since the safety of these buffer writes
conditionally depends on the program’s control flow. For
example, an integer index may be set to a value less than
the array’s length in the true branch of an if statement, and
a value greater than or equal to the array’s length in the
false branch. Knowing whether the buffer write afterward is
safe requires knowing which branch was taken. For instances
where an integer index is first set to an unknown value through
the use of rand(), the label is BUFWRITE_COND_SAFE if
every initial value of this variable results in safe control flow,
and BUFWRITE_COND_UNSAFE otherwise.
The tautological labels BUFWRITE_TAUT_SAFE,
BUFWRITE_TAUT_UNSAFE refer to lines that contain
exactly one buffer write, which is again provably either safe
or unsafe, respectively, but whose safety can be determined
without reasoning about control flow. We call this kind
of vulnerability “tautological”, abusing this term slightly,
because their safety depends on no information about the
program’s control flow. In these instances, the integer index
is always set exactly once in the main scope of the function,
not inside any of the control flow structures.
The *COND* buffer writes always occur in the main scope
of the function, and are always reachable. The *TAUT* labels
are allowed to occur inside the scope of both reachable and
unreachable control flow structures, so they denote the safety
of these lines under the assumption that they can be reached.
Since multiple buffer writes can occur in a file, they are labeled
as if the program would reach these lines even in the case of
an earlier unsafe write (that is, as if the program would not
crash after trying to unsafely write to a buffer).
The BODY label refers to a line in the body of the function
that does not contain a buffer write. The OTHER label refers
to a line outside the body of the function.
B. Static Analysis Engines
A variety of static analysis techniques are applicable to the
buffer overflow detection problem. Consider our motivating
example, in which we wish to determine, for a given array
index operation in a program, if it is possible for the index
to be outside the bounds of the array. In the general case,
for a Turing-complete programming language, answering this
question is undecidable. Analyses therefore make trade-offs
between soundness and completeness [17]. A sound analysis
will never accept an incorrect program—it yields no false
negatives. A complete analysis will always accept a correct
program—it yields no false positives. Due to the noted theoret-
ical limitations, a sound program analysis cannot be complete,
nor a complete analysis sound.
We consider the standard statistical metrics precision and
recall, defined by precision = TPTP+FP and recall =
TP
TP+FN ,
as measures of soundness and completeness. Since a sound
program yields no false negatives, recall = 1, and since a
complete program yields no false positives, precision = 1.
The theory of abstract interpretation provides a framework
for sound static analyses [18]. Under this approach, one
develops sound abstractions of program semantics, which are
used to compute over-approximations of program behavior.
For example, for each array access in a program, we could
over-approximate the domains of the array size and index,
and soundly identify bounds violations—at the risk of yielding
false positives, decreasing precision.
Other analysis approaches sacrifice soundness with the goal
of yielding fewer false positives and/or improving analysis
performance. Loop analysis is one domain where this trade-
off can be made. For example, a static analysis might only
compute the effects of a finite number of loop iterations,
instead of soundly computing the effect of the loop. For the
array bounds problem, this heuristic certainly could yield false
negatives, for instance if a loop contains an array index that is
initially safe, but which goes out of bounds after some number
of iterations. Saxena discusses loop analysis in more detail
[19].
A 2004 study of static analysis tools applied to buffer
overflows provides an overview of techniques that remains rel-
evant, touching on abstract interpretation, symbolic execution,
and model checking [20]. This study also discusses some of
the practical problems tools face, such as aliasing and inter-
procedural analysis. A large body of research has focused on
refining and extending these techniques, for example improv-
ing the precision and efficiency of sound analyzers ( [21]–
[24]), and building better symbolic execution engines [25].
Our work uses four static analysis tools for C. Three of these
tools are open source: Frama-C [26], the Clang static analyzer
[27], and Cppcheck [28]. We also used a commercial static
analysis tool (anonymized). Frama-C provides “a collection
of scalable, interoperable, and sound software analyses” for
ISO C99 source code [26]. We used the value analysis plugin
to Frama-C to look for buffer overflows. This plugin uses
abstract interpretation to compute information about integers
and pointers in C programs, and issues warnings about possible
out-of-bounds accesses. See Kirchner et al. [26] for more
information about the abstract domains employed by Frama-C
to model these program entities. The Clang static analyzer is
based on symbolic execution, and, by default, makes use of
unsound heuristics such as loop unrolling to contend with state
space explosion [29]. We believe Cppcheck also makes use of
unsound heuristics, though little has been published about the
specific approach of this tool. The commercial tool we used
is well-known to be unsound.
C. Memory Network
We test the effectiveness of a data-driven, deep learning-
enabled approach to predicting buffer overflows using a mem-
ory network architecture. Weston et al [30] and Sukhbaatar
et al. [31] developed and refined memory networks to answer
questions about English-language stories in the bAbI dataset,
as described in greater detail in Section V. Choi et al. [1]
performed the first application of memory networks to the
task of buffer overflow prediction in synthetic code. We use
the same architecture as Choi et al. [1] , except for five key
differences, noted below with asterisks.
1) Data Preprocessing: We prepare a C file for processing
by the following procedure.
1) Split the file into lines of code, and tokens within each
line of code, using the libclang interface to clang
[27].
2) (*) Prepend each line with a special token <line i>
indicating its line number. Whereas Choi et al. [1] do
not add line numbers, we do, as a simple preprocessing
step that does not require any additional parameters to be
optimized in the model. Line numbers provide sequential
information to the memory network, which has no way
of representing line order.
3) Using a consistent mapping from tokens to integers
{1, 2, . . . , V − 1} where V − 1 is the number of unique
tokens, convert each token to an integer.
4) Save the integer tokens in an array, using zero padding
on the right (dimension 1, to fill the rest of each line) and
bottom (dimension 0, to fill the missing lines), obtaining
an array of shape NF ×N×J , where NF is the number
of files, N is the maximum number of lines in a file,
and J is the maximum number of tokens in a line. The
elements of the array are the V integers {0, . . . , V −1}.
2) Network Architecture: We describe the forward pass of
the memory network.
Input:
• A program code X [N × J ], consisting of N lines
X1, . . . , XN , where each line Xi is a list of integer tokens
w1i , . . . , w
J
i
• A query line q [1 × J ], equal to one of the lines Xi
encoding a buffer write
Embedding: We fix an embedding dimension d and estab-
lish two learnable embedding matrices Eval and Eaddr, both of
dimension V ×d. Letting A represent both Eval and Eaddr, we
encode each integer token twice, letting Awji [1 × d] be the
wji -th row of A. We use the position encoding of Sukhbaatar
et al. [31] to encode the position of tokens within each line:
for i = 1, . . . , N , define mi [1× d] by
mi =
J∑
j=1
lj ·Awji
where · denotes elementwise multiplication and lj [1 × d] is
defined by its k-th element as
lkj = (1− j/J)− (k/d)(1− 2j/J)
(*) We apply Dropout [32], [33] with parameter 0.3 to each
line, so that
mi [1× d] = Dropout0.3(mi)
We store the lines mi encoded by Eval in a matrix Mval [N×d],
and store the lines encoded by Eaddr in a matrix Maddr. We
embed the query line q by Eaddr and store the result in u1
[1× d].
Memory search: For each “hop number” h = 1, . . . ,H in
a fixed number of “hops” H:
p [N × 1] = softmax(MaddruT )
o [1× d] =
N∑
i=1
pi(Mval)i
(∗) r [1× d] = Rho
(∗) s [1× d] = Normh(r)
uh+1 [1× d] = uh + s
where Rh [d× d] is an internal learnable weight matrix, and
Normh is a batch normalization layer [34] with parameters θh.
Classification:
ŷ [2× 1] = softmax(W (uH)T )
where W [2× d] is a learnable weight matrix.
The forward pass of the network is effectively an iterative
inner-product search [35] matching the current query line uh,
which changes with each processing hop, against each line mi
of the stored memory, which remains fixed.
We use the standard cross-entropy loss function to evaluate
goodness of fit. To train, we use gradient descent to minimize
the loss across the training set as a function of the learnable
parameters Eval, Eaddr, Rh, θh,W . Note that the cross-entropy
loss penalizes false negatives and false positives equally. Our
optimization attempts to maximize the combination of preci-
sion and recall, or viewed differently, attempts to approximate
both soundness and completeness.
Like Choi et al. [1], we use the Adam [36] learning rate
optimizer. (*) Although Choi et al. [1] report they use a
learning rate of 1e-2, we only found acceptable results with a
learning rate of 1e-3. We train each network for 30 epochs. To
compensate for class imbalance, we use a random sampling
technique that always creates batches with input programs and
accompanying query lines such that the number of query lines
with each label are equal.
IV. EVALUATION
In this study, we investigate the effectiveness of memory
networks and static analyzers at predicting security defects in
synthetic code through the following research questions:
• RQ1: How accurate are static analyzers and memory
networks on predicting buffer overflows as a function of
code complexity?
• RQ2: How does the performance of static analyzers
compare with memory networks as a function of training
set size?
• RQ3: What considerations are unique to memory net-
works as compared to other tools that predict buffer
overflows?
A. Methods
The s-bAbI dataset contains four different labels for lines
with buffer writes: two kinds of unsafe writes, and two kinds
of safe writes, as described above. We trained our memory
networks with these four labels, so that e.g. if the network
predicts that a label is BUFWRITE_TAUT_SAFE when the
true label is BUFWRITE_COND_SAFE, the loss function pe-
nalizes this as a wrong answer. In contrast, static analyzers
give warnings when they encounter lines that they find unsafe,
and are not designed to communicate any reasoning process
related to control flow. We will say that a static analyzer gives
a positive result on a buffer write line whenever it generates a
buffer overflow warning; we say that the tool gives a negative
result when it does not issue a buffer overflow warning on that
line. Research Questions 1 and 2 are about comparing memory
networks to static analyzers. To fairly compare memory net-
works to static analyzers, for these questions, we collapse both
ground-truth labels and network predictions to two classes,
unsafe (positive) and safe (negative). Research Question 3 is
only about memory networks. In that discussion, we use the
four classes without collapsing.
To generate the s-bAbI dataset, we use a maximum of ten
unique variable names of the form entity_n. We generate
integers for indices and buffer lengths in the set {0, . . . , 99}.
We generate each buffer write by writing a single character
from the set of digits and ASCII letters.
In our memory network, we use H = 3 processing “hops.”
We use the embedding dimension d = 32.
As described in Section III-A2, we intentionally create
labels under the assumption that the program does not crash
when it attempts to perform an unsafe buffer write. However,
some static analyzers have a sound model of software that
assumes the program stops executing after an unsafe buffer
write attempt. For these tools, we created a “sound subset” of
the test dataset, attempting to minimize the number of buffer
writes queried that occur in program execution after the first
unsafe buffer write. Since we interpret the tool’s output as
“safe” whenever it does not issue a warning, this minimizes
the number of times where we inappropriately interpret “the
program never gets there” as the tool reporting that this line
is safe.
We created the sound subset by querying only the unsafe
buffer write with the smallest line number, and all (safe) buffer
writes with smaller line numbers, in each function. From the
set of all 76549 buffer writes in the full test set, the sound
subset retains 51468 (67%).
This is not a perfect solution, as sometimes the first unsafe
buffer write reached in a program’s control flow is not the
same as the unsafe buffer write with the lowest line number.
For example, if the condition of an if statement is false, then
an unsafe buffer write in the “true” branch will never execute,
even if it is the vulnerability with the lowest line number.
However, we believe that this solution provides a fair enough
testing ground for the sound tools. Although soundness is not
the main focus of this paper, our sound subset appropriately
highlights the high performance of sound tools in the contexts
they were designed for.
B. RQ1: Performance as a function of code complexity
In Table I, we compare the performance of the memory
network and several static analysis tools (open-source tools
clang_sa, cppcheck, frama-c, and a commercial tool)
on the labeled buffer overflow datasets discussed. We use the
F1 metric, the harmonic mean of precision and recall, as a
single-number estimate of the model’s predictive performance
(on a scale from 0 to 1 where higher is better):
F1 =
precision · recall
precision + recall
The F1 captures the tradeoff between precision and recall,
since F1 will only be high if both precision and recall are high.
The memory network’s F1 scores are listed in the minimum,
median, and maximum of 10 independent runs, differing only
by randomness during training in the initialization of network
parameters and in the random order in which training examples
are shown to the network.
TABLE I
F1 (%) PER TASK. ASTERISK INDICATES SOUND TOOL.
tool CJOC-bAbI s-bAbI s-bAbI (sound) Juliet
Mem Net 59.6,71.3,77.9 90.9,91.7,92.5 89.7,90.6,91.7 —
clang_sa — 72.9 84.9 8.0
comm. tool — 93.0 91.9 40.6
cppcheck — 80.4 76.9 2.2
frama-c* — 85.2 98.6 16.3
1) CJOC-bAbI: The CJOC-bAbI column shows our attempt
to replicate the results of Choi et al. [1] on their own dataset
[37]. Specifically, we use their training set of 10,000 functions
and the “level 4” testing set of 1,000 functions, representing
the most challenging test cases. The memory network achieves
moderately good performance on the CJOC-bAbI dataset, with
a median F1 of 71.3%. However, this is significantly less than
the F1 of 82% that they report in their paper. Since they
“averaged the scored of the ten best cases with the smallest
training error,” but do not specify how many cases they chose
the ten best out of, we believe that they may have generated
many more than ten experiments, artificially inflating their
performance.
The static analyzers’ performance is not displayed for the
CJOC-bAbI dataset because although their dataset contains
“C-like” code, there are several issues present that prevent any
example from being valid C. Therefore, it is not possible to
run static analyzers on the dataset without significantly altering
the data.
2) s-bAbI: We display performance of the memory network
and each static analyzer on the full s-bAbI testing set, as well
as on the sound subset. The full testing set has 38,400 files
and 76,549 buffer writes, while the sound subset has 51,468
buffer writes. The tools are able to run without altering the
data because every s-bAbI example is valid C. In this section,
memory network results are shown for the largest training set,
with 153,600 example files, and a total of 307,650 labeled
buffer writes among all the files. Results that evaluate the
memory network’s performance as a function of training set
size are shown in section IV-C.
Although the memory network has high performance on
the s-bAbI datasets, with median F1 of 91.7% and 90.6%,
respectively, it does not decisively outperform all of the static
analyzers on either dataset. One strength of the memory
network is that its recall is higher than that of all static
analyzers on the full testing set, and on all but frama-c in the
sound subset, indicating that it is able to correctly warn on a
greater proportion of the unsafe lines, as seen in Table II. Since
the memory network functions by finding patterns that look
like buffer overflows, it has the opportunity to pick up on many
more potential buffer overflows than static analyzers, which
may fail to find a proof that a given line contains a buffer
overflow. This intuition is supported by the fact that frama-c,
a sound tool, has much greater recall than the memory network
on the sound subset, where it is able to find proofs of buffer
overflow a significantly greater proportion of the time. We
attribute the fact that frama-c’s recall is less than 100% to
the imperfections of the sound subset, as described in III-A2,
and believe that frama-c in fact achieves true soundness on
the sound subset. This implies that the abstract interpretation
model that frama-c uses is sufficient to reason about buffer
overflows on this subset.
TABLE II
SOUNDNESS, MEASURED BY RECALL (%) PER TASK. ASTERISK
INDICATES SOUND TOOL.
tool s-bAbI s-bAbI (sound)
Mem Net 86.7, 88.2, 90.6 84.5, 86.0, 88.7
clang_sa 57.3 73.9
comm. tool 86.8 85.0
cppcheck 68.8 64.2
frama-c* 74.2 97.2
However, the pattern-finding function of the memory net-
work causes it to also generate too many false positives, so
its precision is less than that of the static analyzers, as seen
in Table III.
TABLE III
COMPLETENESS, MEASURED BY PRECISION (%) PER TASK. ASTERISK
INDICATES SOUND TOOL.
tool s-bAbI s-bAbI (sound)
Mem Net 93.9, 95.4, 96.0 94.0, 95.5, 96.4
clang_sa 99.9 99.9
comm. tool 100 100
cppcheck 96.7 95.9
frama-c* 100 100
The high precision values for the static analyzers appear
to indicate that their analysis is complete, even the sound tool
frama-c. This is because the s-bAbI dataset does not contain
safe examples that are challenging enough for these tools to
mistakenly classify as unsafe. Although we believe that these
static analyzers are not complete, s-bAbI’s code is not complex
enough to provide evidence to prove their incompleteness.
We emphasize that since the memory network was trained
only on our synthetic training dataset, its predictive capability
is only high on a dataset with a similar distribution. The testing
dataset was generated from the same dataset as the training
distribution, so the good performance meets expectations. We
would not expect the memory network trained on this dataset
to be able to predict buffer overflows in any code that does
not come from the s-bAbI data generator.
The static analyzers show fairly good performance on the
s-bAbI datasets, although surprisingly not as high as we would
hope, since these are fairly simple test cases without the
complexity of function calls, and with a maximum of three
control flow nodes. Moreover, there is no clear best static
analyzer, as shown by the difference in performance between
the full s-bAbI test set and the sound subset. For example,
since frama-c uses a sound model of program execution, it
performs significantly better on the sound subset.
3) Juliet: The memory networks failed to converge in
training on the Juliet buffer overflow dataset. In every training
run, after only a few epochs, the network’s weights would
be incorrectly tuned so that it would either always predict
“safe” or always predict “unsafe.” This is because the Juliet
dataset is too small and too complex for the memory network
architecture to succeed in learning. Although the Juliet dataset
is, like CJOC-bAbI and s-bAbI, a synthetic dataset, it contains
a relatively small number (5,906) of C files, containing 4,096
lines with buffer overflow. The Juliet dataset is also complex:
there are 116 unique functional variants of buffer overflow
vulnerabilities presented. Therefore for each functional variant
of buffer overflow vulnerability presented, there are only a
small number of files that show examples of that variety.
There is not enough data present for the memory network
to successfully learn the distribution of the dataset.
We also see that the static analyzers have very low per-
formance on the Juliet dataset, confirming previous findings
[5]–[8].
4) Discussion: Although it appears that memory networks
are competitive with static analyzers on the s-bAbI dataset, and
have the advantage of greater recall, they achieve this success
only when being trained on a large, simple, synthetic code
dataset. A weakness of this method is that these models are
likely overfitting to this dataset, memorizing the structure of
s-bAbI instead of the structure of C, as explored more in RQ2
and RQ3. This method does not easily generalize when applied
to a small, complex dataset like Juliet, as there is simply not
enough data to allow the memory network to learn any of
the code’s relevant structure. Although this work shows that
a deep learning method has the ability to learn structure on
code with non-trivial control flow, advancing the initial work
by Choi et al. [1], significant effort is needed to find a method
that will generate to code of real-world complexity.
This work also confirms previous findings that static analyz-
ers have low performance at predicting security vulnerabilities
in the Juliet dataset. A developer wishing to improve the
performance of a static analyzer might be overwhelmed by
the complexity of the Juliet dataset and the number of false
positives and false negatives generated by their tool. The s-
bAbI dataset is considerably less complex than Juliet, but is
still valid C code with control flow structures found in real-
world code, showing places for these tools to be improved.
C. RQ2: Effects of training set size
For memory networks to achieve the high level of perfor-
mance at predicting buffer overflow vulnerabilities in the s-
bAbI dataset, as described in Section IV-A, they need to be
trained on a large dataset, with 153,600 example files, and a
total of 307,650 labeled buffer writes among all the files. For a
data-driven technique to be applied to real code, access to such
a large labeled code dataset is a significant limiting factor. To
show the effect of training set size on network performance,
we ran training runs with identical network parameters on
training datasets of increasing size, evaluating each network
on the same full testing set and sound subset as in Section
IV-B2. The training set size ranges from 9,600 to 153,600 files,
doubling in each experiment. We ran ten training experiments
for each training set size. The results are shown in Figure 2.
9600 19200 38400 76800 153600
Training set size (number of files)
0.725
0.750
0.775
0.800
0.825
0.850
0.875
0.900
0.925
comm.
tool
clang_sa
frama-c
cppcheck
F1 (full)
9600 19200 38400 76800 153600
Training set size (number of files)
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
comm.
tool
clang_sa
frama-c
cppcheck
F1 (sound)
Fig. 2. F1-score as a function of training set size (top) as evaluated on the
entire validation subset (bottom) as evaluated on the sound subset.
Larger training set sizes are correlated with greater overall
performance, shown by the median F1 rising with each in-
crease of the training set size, although we see diminishing
gains as the training set gets larger. On the full validation
set, the median F1s were 84.8% for the smallest training set,
followed by 88.5%, 90.1%, 91.3%, and finally 91.7% for the
largest training set.
Larger training set sizes are also correlated with lower
variability between runs. The networks trained on the smallest
training set are highly variable in predictive performance, with
minimum and maximum F1 scores on the full testing set of
77.8% and 87.4%, respectively. Increasing the training set size
tends to reduce the variability, with the networks trained on
the largest training set having minimum and maximum F1
of 90.9% and 92.5%, respectively. We caution that there are
some exceptions; the networks trained on the training set of
size 76,800 mostly had very small variance in F1, in the
range 90.6%–91.9%, but one run had an F1 of 79.6%. We
intentionally do not exclude this as an outlier, to show that
even with very large training sets, unfavorable gradient descent
conditions can lead to poor performance.
Memory networks trained in the purely-supervised method
of this work need a large amount of labeled training data to
show competitive performance with static analyzers. Since this
amount of labeled training data about security vulnerabilities
is difficult to find and expensive to create for real-world code,
this simple approach is not a viable method for finding security
vulnerabilities with the data sources currently available. A
training method that is more conservative with the need for
labeled data, such as a semi-supervised or active learning
method, as well as a data representation that more accurately
represents the structure of source code, such as a bag of AST
paths [16], or both, will be necessary to create a viable data-
driven method of security vulnerability detection.
D. RQ3: Properties unique to memory networks
Here we consider some properties of the trained memory
networks that help illuminate how they work differently than
static analyzers. These tests are conducted on the full s-bAbI
testing set, since the memory networks do not use a sound
model of program behavior and do not need to be restricted
to the sound subset. As described in Section IV-A, we trained
our networks on four labels, which capture not only the
safety of a line (SAFE or UNSAFE), but also the scope of
reasoning required to prove the safety (COND or TAUT). For
the purpose of these tests, since we are no longer comparing
to static analyzers, we keep all four labels as they are, without
collapsing.
1) Recognizing vulnerability type: In addition to distin-
guishing safe from unsafe, the memory networks are able
to distinguish conditional buffer writes from tautological, as
shown in the confusion matrix in Table IV. Across the ten
networks that were trained on the largest training set, we took
the median value of each cell in their confusion matrices. Rows
indicate the true label. Columns indicate the predicted label.
A block-diagonal structure is evident, showing that the
memory network is decisively able to distinguish between
conditional and tautological buffer writes. Since the integer
TABLE IV
MEDIAN CONFUSION MATRIX.
C_S C_U T_S T_U
C_S 11,378.5 1324.5 0 0
C_U 4,230 21,465.5 0 0
T_S 0 0 18,226 672
T_U 0 0 947 18,303
indices for conditional buffer writes always appear in the
conditions of the if statements and the loop guards of the
for and while loops, and the indices for the tautological
buffer writes never appear in these places, we believe that
the network is making the conditional-or-not decision based
on the co-occurrence of variable names in lines with these
control flow keywords.
2) Failure to generalize: The memory networks are trained
on a corpus with a fixed vocabulary, namely, the set of all
unique tokens in the s-bAbI dataset. Their predictive perfor-
mance, while strong on the testing set that has the same set of
tokens as the training set, does not generalize to a codebase
that contains any tokens not contained in the training set.
Since each token in a given data instance passes through the
embedding matrices Eval and Eaddr, which contain one row for
each element of the training-set vocabulary, any novel token
must be mapped to one of the tokens seen in the training
set for computation to continue, but this mapping necessarily
destroys information crucial to the network’s performance.
For example, the training set contains tokens for the integers
0 through 99. Suppose that we had a modified testing set,
generated by converting every integer literal n into n+1000.
The labels on each line would still be correct, because the
integer indexes and the array lengths are all incremented by
the same amount. However, none of the integer literals 1000
through 1099 are in the training set, so these novel tokens
need to be remapped. If we were unaware that this was the
transformation that had been performed, we would not have
any information about an informative remapping, so it would
be natural to choose an uninformative one, namely mapping
all integer literal tokens to a single integer literal token in the
vocabulary.
We ran this experiment by mapping all tokens representing
integer literals to the token representing 0 in the test set,
then running the same ten trained memory networks on
this modified dataset. Table V shows the resulting confusion
matrix.
TABLE V
MEDIAN CONFUSION MATRIX ON UNSEEN INTEGER SET.
C_S C_U T_S T_U
C_S 2,956 9,741 0 0
C_U 3,083 22,604 1 0
T_S 0 0 16,859 2,038
T_U 0 1 17,066 2,182
We see that the block-diagonal structure still exists, since
it is still possible to identify whether a buffer write’s safety
is conditional or tautological by seeing if its index co-occurs
with control-flow-relevant tokens. But within the blocks, we
see a notable decrease in the memory network’s ability to
distinguish safe from unsafe.
The set of integer literal tokens in C is large, but finite. Even
so, it is unlikely that any code dataset used for training, no
matter how large, will contain all of the integer literal tokens
that could show up in a query to a trained model. Furthermore,
the set of string literals, and the set of valid variable names,
are both infinite. No code dataset will contain all possible
such tokens. Models with the ability to gracefully digest novel
tokens, or a redefinition of tokens that ensures that all possible
tokens are seen during training time, are needed before AI on
code is a real possibility. For example, representing numerical
tokens as numerical quantities, such as in Neural Arithmetic
Logic Units [38], will be necessary for success on fine-grained
code-understanding tasks.
V. RELATED WORK
Our works builds on three distinct threads in the literature:
research on question answering tasks, the emerging literature
of artificial intelligence for software engineering, and the
development of data sets to assess software security tools.
A. Question Answering Tasks
Question answering is a classic problem in text retrieval.
For example, the NIST sponsored Text REterival Conference
(TREC) has had a Question Answering track since 1999 [39].
Current question answering systems are able to rival human
performance for a subset of tasks focusing on answering
realistic reading comprehension questions [10], [11].
Our work is closely related to that of Weston’s group at
Facebook, where they took an alternative approach: for a
simple neural network, find the limits of the questions it
can answer by generating synthetic, labeled data which are
sufficiently complex to break the network, and then improve
the neural network until the tasks are able to be cleared [30],
[40]. More specifically, the memory network architecture first
proposed by Weston et al. [30] to answer reading compre-
hension questions about short stories in the English language,
trained and tested on the original bAbI dataset [40]. Weston
et al’s training scheme involved supplying the network with a
story, broken into sentences, a single-sentence question about
the story. The ground-truth data that they used during training
included both a single-word correct answer to the question,
and the set of sentences in the story that were relevant to
answer the question. Sukhbaatar et al. [31] refined the memory
network architecture so that the set of relevant sentences did
not need to be supplied during training, an improvement that
they give the name end-to-end training. We use this approach
in our work, although in the domain of source code instead of
natural language.
B. Artificial Intelligence for Software Engineering
There is much recent interest in applying artificial intelli-
gence and machine learning techniques to a variety of software
engineering tasks; see [15] for a comprehensive review. The
two papers closest to our work are Russel et al. [41], which
attempts to identify vulnerabilities at the function level, and
Choi et al. [1]. which attempts to identify vulnerabilities at the
line level.
Our work builds on Choi et al. [1], which used a variant
of the Sukhbaatar et al. [31] architecture to predict buffer
overflow vulnerabilities at the line level in synthetic source
code. They trained and tested on a synthetic code dataset
that they created, which we refer to as CJOC-bAbI. Their
work, however, has several limitations: first, CJOC-bAbI was
not valid C, making it difficult to compare against existing
static analysis tools. Second, CJOC-bAbI only generated basic
blocks, and the absence of loops, conditionals, and variables
of unknown value make their test cases far too simple.
Our work is a natural extension of Choi et al. [1] where we
address the major shortcomings of their paper: we generate
valid C code instead of ‘C-like’ code; we incrementally
increase the complexity of the code generated to include con-
ditionals and loops; and we study how well the combination
of the representation used to input the code into the neural
network and the network architecture interact during training
at the line level.
C. Software Security Data Sets
The development and testing of software security data sets
is well established in the literature. We note, however, that
much of the existing work on software security data sets
focuses primarily on finding realistic defects in realistic code, a
high, and important threshold to cross. For example, the NIST
Software Assurance Metrics And Tool Evaluation (SAMATE)
project [42], which has coordinated the release of several
data sets (Juliet [4], SARD [3], IARPA Stone Soup [43] and
hosted competitions for static analysis tools [44]–[47], focuses
on realistic test cases. Similarly, LAVA [48] and many other
efforts ( [5], [20], [49]–[52]) have focused on the realism of
the defect in realistic code settings.
Although the goal of these projects is to find realistic defects
in realistic code, their performance is not yet high enough; i.e.
Table I and De Oliveira et al. [53].
Our work, in contrast, is more modest: we attempt to find
the minimal code complexity necessary to break the state of
the art AI system [1]. In doing so, we find that a memory
network can learn how to identify buffer overflows in synthetic
code, but the it appears as though the memory network needs
a nearly exhaustive amount of training data in order to do so.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this study, we investigate the limits of the current state of
the art AI system for detecting buffer overflows and compare
it with current static analysis engines. To do so, we developed
a code generator, s-bAbI, capable of producing an arbitrarily
large number of samples of controlled complexity. We found
that the static analysis engines we examined have good preci-
sion, but poor recall on this dataset, except for a sound static
analyzer that has good precision and recall. We found that the
state of the art AI system, a memory network modeled after
Choi et al. [1], can achieve similar performance to the static
analysis engines, but requires an exhaustive amount of training
data in order to do so.
Our work implies that there are three threads of future work:
First, further developing static analysis engines to improve
their recall against this minimally complex class of synthetic
code as a lower bar than NIST’s more realistic code datasets.
Second, improving AI systems to the point were they can at
least solve s-bAbI. And, third, increasing the complexity of
s-bAbI to find the additional failure modes of improved static
analysis engines and AI systems.
Future work on the latter two threads might include im-
proving the representations of how code is encoded for the
AI system (e.g. directly modeling scope, such as with a bag
of AST paths [16]), as we suggest in RQ2, and modifying
the network to be able to compute on integer representations
(e.g. integrating Neural Arithmetic Logic Units [38]) instead
of merely memorizing the finite amount of training data and
relying on inner product search), as we suggest in RQ3.
The performance characteristics of these modeling approaches
would then give insight into how to modify s-bAbI so that the
new code would defeat the new models. By iterating in this
way, we are hopeful to improve the state of security defect
prediction.
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